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Abstract 
Agents often have mental representations involving notions and ideas which are acquired by deferential appeal to epistemic 
authorities and which the agents cannot interpret. One of the questions I will answer in this paper is whether these mental 
representations in which deferential items are involved constitute beliefs the agents have. To this question my answer will be 
affirmative, pace Sperber, who considers these representations to be semantically undetermined. In this sense, following 
Recanati, I will consider that deferential beliefs, while epistemically undetermined, are determined from a semantic point of 
view. This is the first part of a two-part paper. 
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1. Introduction 
A speaker succeeds in making a true belief report only if the agent referred to in the report has the belief the 
speaker is ascribing to him. In the same vein, a report of a deferential belief will be true only if the agent the report 
is about has the belief in question, that is, a belief involving notions or ideas that he does not understand. It has been 
suggested, however, that a mental representation involving notions or ideas not fully understood by the agent does 
not constitute a belief (Sperber, 1997). If things were like that, then it seems that we can't provide the truth-
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +4-072-655-1421. 
E-mail address: mihaihincu@gmail.com 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of LUMEN 2014. 
383 Mihai Hîncu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  149 ( 2014 )  382 – 389 
conditions of a deferential belief report. But our daily linguistic practice confirms that we can truthfully report the 
deferential beliefs of others, thus offering support to our intuition that a mental representation involving items not 
understood is, after all, a belief. In the first part of this two-part study, I will try to secure, following Recanati, the 
truth-conditions of a deferential belief report. On this background, I will offer, in the second part of the present 
study, a semantic treatment of deferential belief reports using the format of the semantics of belief reports put forth 
by Crimmins and Perry. 
2. Metarepresentations 
In what follows, I will proceed assuming that in the cognitive architecture of an agent a there is a doxastic 
module Md in which all of a’s beliefs are stocked. With this perspective in mind, we can say that a belief a has is a 
mental representation made up of ideas and notions which is present in the doxastic module of a’s cognitive 
architecture. Thus, a believes that the Dalai Lama is a Buddhist only if he has a belief b whose content is the 
proposition that the Dalai Lama is a Buddhist, that is only if in the doxastic module Md of a’s cognitive architecture 
there is a representation involving an idea about what it is to be a Buddhist and a notion which he has about the 
Dalai Lama. In other words, a believes p only if a has a representation r in Md whose content is p. 
Nevertheless, an agent a can generally have a representation r which involves a notion or an idea that he does not 
fully understand, more precisely, a deferential notion or idea. In this case, is the representation r still present in a’s 
doxastic module, does r still constitute a belief? To this question Dan Sperber gives a negative answer. Considering 
that the doxastic module of an agent a includes only representations made up of items (i.e., ideas and notions) which 
the agent a completely understands, Sperber’s diagnosis is that if a representation r involves a deferential notion or 
idea, r is a quasi-belief and therefore a cannot believe what he does not understand (1997: 71). In what follows I will 
show that Sperber is not right and that every agent has deferential beliefs, beliefs which involve deferential notions 
and ideas. In other words, I will argue that an agent a can believe something which he does not understand. In this 
respect, I will adopt the approach which Recanati uses in his critique of Sperber’s ideas (Recanati, 2000). 
Every representation r1, be it mental or linguistic, can constitute the object of a higher-order representation r2. 
The higher-order representation r2 by means of which the representation r1 is represented is called a 
metarepresentation. Since a representation which constitutes the object of a higher-order representation, that is an 
object-representation, can be either mental or linguistic and since the higher-order representation can also be either 
mental or linguistic, Sperber identifies four types of metarepresentations (2000a: 3). Thus, let us consider that an 
agent a, having in his doxastic module the beliefs (1) and (2), utters the sentences (3) and (4):  
(1)   < Irina believes that Mihai loves her. > 
(2)   < Irina says that Mihai loves her. > 
(3)   Irina believes that Mihai loves her. 
(4)   Irina says that Mihai loves her.   
If the belief illustrated by (1) is a mental representation whose object is another mental representation, the belief 
illustrated by (2) is a mental representation whose object is a linguistic representation. Similarly, if the sentence (3) 
uttered by a in a context is a linguistic representation whose object is a mental representation, the sentence (4) 
uttered by a is a linguistic representation whose object is another linguistic representation. 
Metarepresentations (1)-(4) share the characteristic of being representations whose object is another 
representation. In this regard, all metarepresentations essentially have this feature. However, not every 
representation whose object is another representation will constitute, in its turn, a metarepresentation (Sperber, 
2000b: 117). For instance, the sentence: 
(5)   Irina has a belief. 
is a linguistic representation whose object is a mental representation which Irina has, but the content of the belief 
mentioned in the surface syntax of sentence (5) is not represented. In this case, the linguistic representation does not 
constitute an example of metarepresentation.  
Given a representation r which an agent a has, r can be present in two ways in his doxastic module Md. The 
representation r can be present in Md directly or indirectly (Sperber, 1985: 55). In the former case, having an 
inferential impact on other beliefs in Md, as well as a causal impact on a’s behaviours, the representation r will be a 
full belief. For example, if the representation r is the representation “It is raining in Bucharest”, r can have logical 
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relations with a representation r' “Bucharest is the capital of Romania” and with a representation r'' “It is raining in 
the capital of Romania”, as well as with specific behaviours which a performs based on this representation. In the 
second case, the representation r is retained indirectly by means of a complex representation in which it is 
encapsulated (Sperber, 1997: 69-71). This time, r is an object-representation which, as an internal representation of a 
metarepresentation present in a’s doxastic module, has neither inferential impact, nor causal impact. Being logically 
insulated from the other beliefs in a’s doxastic module, r will be a quasi-belief (Recanati, 2000: 264). For example, 
a can have in his Md the belief “Irina believes that the square circle is a real mathematical object”, without believing 
himself that that the square circle is a real mathematical object. In this case, the metarepresentation is retained as a 
belief in a’s doxastic module, while the object-representation “The square circle is a real mathematical object” 
constitutes only a quasi-belief inferentially insulated from the other beliefs in Md.  
In Sperber’s conception, a quasi-belief r cannot be directly present in the doxastic module Md of an agent a. If a 
quasi-belief r were directly present in Md, then r would no longer be a part of a complex representation which 
encompasses it. Since it would be an autonomous representation and not just an object-representation internal of a 
metarepresentation, r would no longer be an insulated representation in Md. Not being insulated, r could have logical 
relations with other representations in Md. Other things being equal, this can generate inconsistency at the level of 
Md. In this case, the presence of the quasi-belief r in Md leads, from a logical point of view, to inconsistency between 
r and the other beliefs which a retains in Md (Sperber, 1985: 54-55). I will illustrate this idea in the following 
example. Let us suppose that a has in Md a belief, more precisely a metarepresentation which he linguistically 
expresses by uttering the sentence:  
(6)   Irina believes that the rose has wings.  
If a’s doxastic module were to directly include his quasi-belief, that is the object-representation r to which the 
sentence: 
(7)   The rose has wings 
corresponds at the level of the natural language, it is obvious that, at the level of Md, a contradictory relationship 
would be established between r and the representations r' and r'' which correspond to the sentences: 
(8)   The rose is a flower. 
and  
(9)   Flowers do not have wings. 
In the example above, the presence of the quasi-belief r in Md does not constitute an inferential utility for the 
agent a. However, there are cases when a quasi-belief of a can be directly present in Md. In these cases, the object-
representation r insulated in Md is emancipated, thus being able to participate in inferences and to constitute a valid 
reason for a’s behaviours. With regard to this Recanati writes:  
 
An insulated representation can be emancipated, if the metarepresentational frame within which it is embedded is 
a validating frame: a frame such as 'It is true that...’. If we believe that it is true that turtles lay eggs, we are 
automatically justified in believing that turtles lay eggs. (Recanati, 2000: 265). 
 
To Sperber, if an object-representation r involves a notion or an idea that the agent a cannot interpret, r cannot be 
emancipated. Since the agent a is not capable of determining uniquely the content of the notion or the idea involved 
in the representation r, Sperber considers that r is not semantically well-formed (1985: 51). According to Sperber, in 
cases like these, the representation r will not have for the agent a a complete semantic content. Thus, if the object-
representation r which is internal to the metarepresentation agent a linguistically expresses by uttering the sentence: 
(10)   The doctor said that Irina had arthritis.  
involves a notion that a does not understand, for example the deferential notion ndarthritis, then the representation r 
cannot be emancipated because a cannot interpret the notion, therefore he cannot uniquely determine its content. 
Given the fact that the deferential notion involved in the object-representation r is semantically defective, r remains 
insulated from the representations in Md which a can interpret, thus constituting a quasi-belief.  
To Sperber, the semantic status of a mental representation is the fundamental criterion based on which he 
establishes the differences between beliefs and quasi-beliefs (Recanati, 2000: 270). Thus, the belief is seen as being 
a semantically determined mental representation r involving notions and ideas that an agent a who has r can 
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understand and interpret and that uniquely express a complete semantic content (i.e., a proposition). Since the 
object-representation r which constitutes a quasi-belief involves ideas and notions that the agent a does not 
understand, r is semantically undetermined (Recanati, 2000: 270). 
Adopting the semantic analysis of the indexical and demonstrative terms offered by Kaplan, it can be argued that 
beliefs, as mental representations, as well as the items which make them up (i.e., notions and ideas), can be analysed 
as having a character and a content (Kaplan, 1989: 505). In this sense, Recanati considers that given a mental 
representation r, r can be semantically undetermined in two ways (2000: 270). Consequently, a representation r can 
be semantically undetermined at content level or at character level. When the representation r is undetermined at the 
level of the content, r has a determined character, but r’s character does not determine the content r expresses (i.e., 
the proposition). On the other hand, if the representation r is semantically undetermined at the level of the character, 
r does not have a determined character.  
To Sperber, a quasi-belief is semantically undetermined at both character and content level (Recanati, 2000: 270). 
Since a quasi-belief is a mental representation r which involves notions or ideas that the agent a does not 
understand, it follows that r does not have a determined character for a. As it is semantically undetermined at 
character level, r cannot have the complete semantic content of a belief which the agent a is capable to uniquely 
determine, therefore r has a different content from the content expressed by a belief. Since a belief is semantically 
determined at content level, it follows that a quasi-belief will be semantically undetermined at content level as well. 
3. Cases of deference  
In what follows, I will argue, against Sperber, that a deferential representation is not semantically undetermined 
at character level and that it can appear in the doxastic module Md of an agent a. To Sperber, a deferential 
representation is a quasi-belief, that is a mental representation which, as an object-representation internal to a 
metarepresentation, has the property of being semantically undetermined at the level of its kaplanian character. At 
this point of the presentation, a difference should be drawn between two types of cases: cases in which an item (i.e., 
a notion or an idea) which renders a representation r deferential does not have a public character and cases in which 
the deferential item involved in a representation has a public character, but this character is not accessible to the 
agent of r. Using Recanati’s terminology, I will name the former cases sperberian cases and the latter ones burgean 
cases. Thus, if in the sperberian cases, the item involved in an object-representation r internal to a 
metarepresentation present in Md, can be interpreted neither at subjective level by the agent of r, nor at public level, 
in the burgean cases, the item from r can be interpreted at public level by other agents, but cannot be interpreted at 
subjective level by the agent of r (Recanati, 2000: 267).  
In what follows, I will provide an example for each separate case. The specificity of the sperberian cases consists 
in the fact that, given a deferential representation r which an agent a has, r cannot be interpreted at personal level by 
a, nor at public level by other agents. Let us consider the case in which the belief a student a has in his doxastic 
module Md, is a metarepresentation which he linguistically expresses by uttering the sentence:  
(11)   The professor has said during the lecture that  
          the retentional fold of self-awareness is a nonphenomenal trace. 
It is obvious that both student a and the other students who heard the lecture, import the professor’s belief by an 
act of epistemic deference. Neither a, nor his colleagues are able to uniquely determine the semantic content 
expressed by the utterance the professor makes by using in the context of his lecture the that-clause of the report 
(11). Unable to agree on the adequate interpretation of the professor’s words, the students will retain a deferential 
representation made up of items which do not have a public character. Since the deferential representation acquired 
as such by the students can be interpreted neither at subjective level, nor at public level, it follows that it is a 
representation semantically undetermined at content level. As we have seen above, a representation r which is 
semantically undetermined at content level can be semantically determined at the level of the kaplanian character if 
r has a determined character. Since to Sperber the object-representation internal to the metarepresentation expressed 
by (11) does not have any character accessible to a, nor any public character, it follows that the deferential 
representation is semantically undetermined at character level as well.   
Unlike the sperberian cases, the burgean cases are cases of deference in which an object-representation r internal 
to a metarepresentation present in Md involves an item which only r’s agent cannot interpret at subjective level 
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(Recanati, 2000: 267). Thus, let us suppose that an agent a has in his doxastic module Md the metarepresentation 
which he linguistically expresses by uttering the above mentioned sentence (10):   
(10)   The doctor said that Irina had arthritis.  
The object-representation r internal to the metarepresentation of a involves a notion that a does not understand and 
which he cannot interpret, more precisely the deferential notion ndarthritis. In this case, the deferential notion from r 
has a kaplanian character which, though inaccessible to a, is a public character. Since the deferential notion involved 
in r has a public character and since the character of a representation determines its content in a situation, it follows 
that the deferential representation r is semantically determined, therefore r has a determined content even if a does 
not know what this content is. In cases like this, the deferential representation is epistemically undetermined while, 
with regard to its kaplanian character, as well as to the semantic content it expresses, the representation is 
semantically determined (Recanati, 2000: 274). 
We notice that what distinguishes the sperberian cases is the fact that a deferential representation r is 
semantically undetermined, at least on the level of its character. However, is there any justification to Sperber’s idea 
according to which if a deferential representation does not express a definite semantic content, it is semantically 
undetermined at character level? In other words, can an agent have a deferential representation when this very same 
representation does not have a determined character which is accessible to him? The answer Recanati gives to these 
questions is negative. In this sense, he writes:  
 
In order to be entertained, a mental representation must be endowed with a character. Now the character in 
question – that which a mental sentence must possess in order to be entertained – must be accessible to the thinker: it 
must be a character which the subject herself grasps. The public character of the sentence is not sufficient if the 
subject does not grasp it. (Recanati, 2000: 272). 
 
To consider that an agent can have a mental representation whose character remains inaccessible to him raises a 
problem for the sperberian cases of deference. In order to deal with this problem, I will resort to a solution proposed 
by Recanati. Recanati puts forth the hypothesis of the existence of a deferential operator Rx() at the level of an 
agent’s mental representations, operator which has the feature of being directly referential (2000: 279). By applying 
the deferential operator to a notion n, respectively to an idea i, involved in a representation r an agent a has, the 
result is a deferential notion Rx(n), respectively a deferential idea Rx(i). Since this operation generates changes only 
at the level of kaplanian character of the item involved in a mental representation, it follows that the deferential 
notion Rx(n) which is available to a, has an identical content to the content the notion n has for the individual x to 
whom a defers (Recanati, 2000: 281). In the same vein, the deferential idea Rx(i) which a has acquired will have an 
identical content to the content the idea i has for x. In order to make it easier to understand, let us consider the 
following example. Irina has the mental representation:  
(12)   < I was diagnosed with Rdoctor(arthritis). > 
at the level of which a deferential operator is present. In this case, the character of her deferential notion is a 
function from the situation in which Irina refers to the doctor who used the term 'arthritis' to linguistically express 
her diagnosis to the content of the term (notion) the doctor has about arthritis. The content of the doctor’s notion is 
determined by a character which is public and accessible to him. In this case, the content of Irina’s deferential notion 
is identical to the referential content the doctor assigns to his notion. Since the content of the notion to which the 
deferential operator applies is not different from the content of the notion which the person to whom Irina defers 
has, it follows that the only difference between Irina’s deferential representation and the doctor’s representation 
concerns the characters of the notions involved in her representation. Thus, the deferential representation involving 
the notion Irina has about arthritis is, like any other deferential representation, metarepresentational at character 
level and not at the level of the content which it expresses (Recanati, 2000: 278).  
Even though the notion Irina acquires by deference to the epistemic authority of the doctor and the notion the 
doctor has about arthritis both refer to the same thing, it does not mean that Irina succeeds in determining the 
content of her deferential notion. In this case, Irina has a deferential notion about arthritis, her notion has a content 
(i.e., the inflammation of the joints), but she does not understand to what exactly this notion refers. With respect to 
the referential content of the notion Irina has acquired by deference, she is not in a good epistemic position, that is, 
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she doesn’t know what the content her deferential representation expresses is. In this case, her deferential 
representation is epistemically undetermined even though it is semantically determined at both content level (the 
referent of the deferential notion is fixed independently of Irina’s knowledge) and character level.  
At this point of the presentation, it is obvious that Recanati’s solution has the merit of showing how to reconcile 
two apparently opposite theoretical directions. Let us consider that an agent a has a deferential representation r and 
that the representation r has a public character. According to the internalism, given that the agent a could not grasp 
the public character of the representation r, it follows that what is relevant for a is not r’s public character, but the 
character that r has for a. Consider now the case in which the agent a has a deferential representation r and that the 
representation r has a referential content. According to the externalism, the fact that the representation r has a 
referential content does not imply that a has the necessary cognitive resources to know what the content of r is. 
Thus, with respect to the deferential representation r of the agent a, the internalist intuitions are justified at the level 
of r’s character while the externalist intuitions are well-founded at the level of the referential content that r 
expresses. Since the notion involved in a deferential representation r has a public character inaccessible to a, and 
since the agent a can have a representation only if a has access to the representation’s character, it follows that, 
unlike r’s content which depends on facts extrinsic to a, r’s character depends on a (i.e., r’s character is in the mind 
of the agent who has r) (Woodfield, 2000: 446). 
Recanati’s solution allows to distinguish between the character of a notion n, respectively of an idea i, and the 
character of the deferential notion Rx(n), respectively of a deferential idea Rx(i). We have seen above that, while in 
burgean cases, the notion an agent a acquires by deference to an epistemic authority has a public character 
inaccessible to a, in sperberian cases, the notion a acquires by deference does not have a public character. The same 
goes for the case in which a acquires by deference an idea i. Nevertheless, the two cases of deference have 
something in common: the agent a has access to the character of the deferential notion Rx(n) involved in the 
representation a has and not to the public character of the notion n, which is absent in the sperberian cases and 
inaccessible to a in the burgean cases (Recanati, 2000: 273).      
Since the character of a notion n contextually determines n’s content, and since the n’s content is identical to the 
content of the deferential notion Rx(n), it follows that, in both sperberian and burgean cases, the content of the 
deferential notion Rx(n) which an agent a has, depends on the character of the notion n available to the agent x to 
whom a defers (Recanati, 2000: 273). Thus, in burgean cases, given that the notion a acquires by deference to x has 
a public character, it can be concluded that his deferential notion has a determined content. As the content x assigns 
to n is identical to the content of the deferential notion Rx(n), it follows that Rx(n) has a determined content even 
though, with respect to this referential content, a is not in a good epistemic position. As the deferential notion Rx(n) 
has a determined character and content, it is obvious that the deferential representation r in which Rx(n) is involved 
will also have a determined character and content. Consequently, a deferential representation r is semantically 
determined at both character and content level (Recanati, 2000: 273-274). On the other hand, in the sperberian cases 
of deference, the notion a acquires by deference to x does not have a public character, which means that x does not 
assign to this notion a definite content. Since x cannot uniquely determine the content of the notion n, it follows that 
the deferential notion Rx(n) does not have a definite content. Since the deferential notion Rx(n) has a character 
accessible to a, it follows, as Recanati rightly showed, that the deferential representation r in which Rx(n) is involved 
will also have a character (2000: 274). Therefore, given the fact that the deferential representation r is semantically 
determined at character level, it is clear that Sperber’s thesis, according to which r is semantically undetermined, is 
not correct. 
As we have seen above, according to Sperber, a deferential representation r cannot be directly present in the 
doxastic module Md of an agent a. Sperber justifies this idea as follows: as it is deferential, the representation r 
involves a notion n or an idea i which the agent of r does not understand and which he cannot interpret. Since a is 
not in a good epistemic position regarding the referential content n or i expresses, it follows that a will not know the 
content expressed by the representation r. In this case, the deferential representation r is included in Md as an object-
representation internal to a metarepresentation the agent a has, a representation which is insulated from the other 
representations in Md (Sperber, 1997: 69-71). Given that the metarepresentation in Md constitutes a belief itself, it 
follows that the deferential representation r cannot be a belief, but only a quasi-belief. Therefore, an agent a cannot 
believe something he does not understand. However, given the fact that a notion n involved in a representation q of 
an agent x has the same content as the deferential notion Rx(n) involved in a representation r of an agent a, where q 
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differs from r only regarding the notion n, can Sperber’s conclusion that deferential representations are not beliefs 
still be justified? Can we still embrace the idea that a deferential representation r cannot be directly present in the 
doxastic module Md of an agent a? 
Let us consider the case in which the agent m is Irina’s father and accompanies her to a doctor’s office. After 
having done all the necessary investigations, the doctor conveys to m the information that Irina has an inflamed 
larynx. Let us suppose that m accomplishes an act of epistemic deference to the authority of the person who 
established Irina’s diagnosis and that he does not understand what the term used by the doctor about the diagnosed 
organ refers to. In this situation, what will be the representation m will have in his doxastic module? In Sperber’s 
conception, only the metarepresentation:  
(13)   < The doctor said that Irina’s Rdoctor(larynx) is inflamed. > 
has the privilege of appearing in the doxastic module Md of m. Given the fact that the object-representation internal 
to the metarepresentation (13) involves a notion which m does not understand, it follows that the representation in 
which his deferential notion is involved is not emancipated, which makes it impossible for the representation   
(14)   < Irina’s larynx is inflamed. > 
to be present in m’s doxastic module.  
In the established scenario, according to Sperber, only the doctor can have this representation. Unlike m, the 
doctor, being an epistemic authority, does not have a deferential notion about the first segment of the airways, but a 
scientific notion.   
As previously shown, even though the public character of the notion the agent a acquires by deference is 
inaccessible to a, as it happens in the burgean cases, or absent as the sperberian cases show, the character of the 
deferential notion is accessible to the agent a. Therefore, the character of m’s notion about the organ of phonation is 
accessible to him, even if this character is not its public character which, in this scenario, is accessible only to the 
doctor. At the same time, the content of the deferential notion involved in the object-representation internal to the 
metarepresentation (13) is identical to the content of the notion the doctor has about the larynx, notion involved in 
the representation mentioned above. Since the only difference between the object-representation of the 
metarepresentation (13) and the representation (14) is the one between their kaplanian characters, it follows that the 
deferential representation: 
(15)   < Irina’s Rdoctor(larynx) is inflamed. > 
is semantically determined at both character and content level. As it is metarepresentational at character level, the 
deferential representation (15) satisfies all the conditions to be present in m’s doxastic module. Therefore, m will 
have in his doxastic module both the metarepresentation (13) and the deferential representation (15). Given the fact 
that m’s doxastic module contains a deferential representation, it follows that Sperber’s thesis, according to which m 
cannot believe something he does not understand cannot be sustained.  
4. Conclusion 
We have seen above that when we have to do with burgean cases of deference, our representations are 
epistemically undetermined. In cases like these, even though we are not in a good epistemic position regarding the 
contents of our deferential representations, these are determined, from a semantic point of view, at character and 
content level. As they are semantically determined, our deferential representations have the same referential content 
as the representations exploited by those to whom we defer. As in both the sperberian and burgean cases of 
deference the character of the deferential item is available to us, it follows that a representation involving a 
deferential notion or idea is, after all, a belief. Therefore, the truth-conditions of the belief reports which inform us 
about the agents’ deferential representations and which will be semantically treated in the second part of the present 
study, are now secured. 
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